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INTERNATIONAL SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET:
A PROPOSAL*
JEROME S. CARDIN,

DAVID M. FLEISHMAN AND GEORGE PAUL STAMAS**
Although the current world housing shortage is of epidemic
proportion, the present global response has been insufficient to
reverse the steadily worsening situation. Private capital in particular has not been mobilized adequately in housing construction
programs: there is presently no international market or mechanism to channel available private capital into residential construction in developing countries. This paper suggests a remedy to
the present situation in the form of an international secondary
mortgage market. In brief, we propose a type of readily marketable security, the mortgage-backed bond, of sufficiently low risk
to be competitive with other internationally marketed securities.
The bond is modeled on the domestic Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA) mortgage-backed bond, in which
the bond is secured by the pool of mortgages held by the bond
issuer. This domestic program is modified in the present proposal
to insure against the risks peculiar to international transactions.
Because such bonds can attract private capital to international
housing construction, they would free substantial public funds
from direct investment in public housing. A portion of these
newly freed funds would then be available to provide the insurance
necessary to attract international investment.
Socioeconomic Considerations
The social importance of adequate housing is self-evident.
Proper shelter is a basic element of social well-being. The role
of housing in overall economic development, however, is not as
clear. In the past, housing was accorded low priority in development planning; economists reasoned that adequate housing could
be developed only after, and as a result of, the infusion of capital
* This paper was originally presented in Paris on October 31, 1975 before a
meeting of Subcommittee II of the Section on Business Law of the International Bar
Association, of which Mr. Cardin is a member.
** Members, Maryland Bar. The authors acknowledge the editorial assistance of
the staff of the INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL.
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in other sectors of the economy.1 Contemporary economists, however, believe that "in many developing countries the construction
industry is one of the most efficient absorbers of labor and a
strong generator of backward linkages in the materials and equipment industries, both of which are likely to have large local2
components and only minimal foreign exchange requirements.1
In housing, the multiplier coefficient of investment helps create
a self-sustaining building industry and serves as a means of increasing gross national product.8 In short, contemporary econo1. A. MADDISON,
at 266-68, 283 (1970).

ECONOMIC

PROGRESS AND

See also UNITED

POLICY IN

NATIONS:

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,

INTEGRATION

OF HOUSING INTO

A SYSTEMS APPROACH, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/185.
2. U.N. Doc. OPI/CESI Note 317 at 2 (April 21, 1975). This report from
the Centre for Economic and Social Information summarizes a speech by E. Paul
Mwaluko, Director of the U.N. Center for Housing, Building and Planning. Mr.
Mwaluko pointed out that:
[m]ost national and state governments are not in a financial position to support urban development adequately, because their revenue base is not strong
relative to resource needs and is generally underutilized presently. Also, their
administrative capacity to improve fiscal machinery is still limited. There is
often also a political reluctance to give high priority to a nation's one or two
major cities (except for essential national functions, such as major industrial
development and port facilities) because of massive claims for investment from
the rural areas that still have 80 per cent or more of national populations, ...
3. Id. at 2. The economic role of housing development has begun to receive more
attention in the literature. E.g.,
The low priorities given to housing and urban planning are the result of
widespread misunderstandings of their role in the development process. Scarcity
of investment funds in the developing countries and the application of inappropriate
indices such as capital-output ratios have resulted in poor acceptance of housing
construction as an investment alternative. While few economists question the
value of housing construction per se, they see it as a relatively unattractive investment alternative in countries where capital resources are scarce. They apparently
overlook the fact that, even without specifying input-output ratios the development
impact of housing can be immense, because it amounts to up to 30 percent of
overall construction....
Note, A World Housing Agency: InternationalAid to Remedy the World Housing
Deficit, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. PoL. 67, 78 (1972) [hereinafter cited as World Housing
Agency]. Citing statistics on amount of housing construction relative to gross national
product in Puerto Rico, this note goes on to state:
This casts serious doubt on the assumption of direct dependence of construction
on the general economy and the advisability of national action predicated on that
assumption. It must be borne in mind at the same time that construction is a
labor intensive industry that can be very important in meeting the challenge of
unemployment in underdeveloped areas.
Id. at 78.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS.
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mists view housing construction as a prime means for employing
intermediate and indigenous technologies so as to directly improve
living standards and strengthen long-term national economies
through the backward linkages that arise from that construction.'
On a broader scale, public housing policies, whether brought to
fruition by the application of public capital or of private capital,
are an important means of influencing other social and economic
variables.
This proposal for the attraction of private capital into the
housing construction industries of developing nations is founded
in both social and economic theory. An international secondary
mortgage market could advance the social and economic wellbeing of the people affected, without compromising self-determination and international independence.
This article first assesses the magnitude of the world housing
shortage and the response of international organizations and
national governments in their attempts to alleviate that shortage.
A discussion of primary and secondary domestic and international
mortgage markets follows. Finally an international secondary
mortgage market embodying those safeguards necessary for
achieving an acceptable level of investor risk is proposed.
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE HOUSING SHORTAGE
AND THE RESPONSE OF THE
WORLD COMMUNITY
The current housing shortage is a worldwide problem, but its
effects are felt most strongly in the developing countries: slums
and shanty towns are growing at an annual rate of 12 to 15
percent in Asian, African and Latin American countries. 5 Com4. The importance of housing in the economic scheme of developing countries
is not universally accepted. One commentator has maintained that "[miost economists
and loan officers continue to maintain that the time is not yet ripe for national resources
of the developing countries to be channelled into housing." Robinson, Secondary
Markets for Home Mortgages: Latin American and CaribbeanExperience, 10 J. INT'L
L. EcoN. 89, 90 (1975). See also, Robock, Are There Development Lessons from
Brazil?, 18 INT'L DEV. REv. 16, 21-22 (1976).
5. See generally, Implications of Population Trends on Urban Development and
Housing, XXIV EcoN. BULL. ASIA AND FAR EAST 53, 61 (1973), U.N. Doc. No.

E/CN.11/1105 (1973).
While population in developing countries typically grows at 2 to 3 per cent
annually and many city populations grow at rates exceeding 6 per cent, slums and
uncontrolled settlements in urban areas commonly grow at rates of 12 per cent and
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mentators have expressed growing apprehensions about the
quality and existence of adequate shelter in the year 2000, when
it is estimated that 40 million new dwellings will be needed
annually, 30 million in the less developed countries.6
In the past two decades, public international organizations
have recognized the magnitude of the housing shortage. The
United Nations, for example, has often endorsed in principle the
development of financial assistance programs for housing. In 1972
the General Assembly called for the establishment of an international housing fund,7 and as recently as 1974 the Assembly
sometimes exceed 20 per cent. At 12 per cent, population doubles in less than
seven years.
Id. at 58. See also E. WEISSMAN, THE URBAN CRISIS, ITS MEANING FOR DEVELOPMENT,

3 U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

No. 4, at 48 (1966).

6. It has been estimated that before the end of this century between 1,100 million
and 1,400 million new dwelling units must be constructed in the world. Assuming
a medium estimate of 1,250 million, an average annual output of more than 40
million new dwellings is required; about 10 million in the more developed areas
and 30 million in the less developed areas. This indicates the formidable nature of
the task ahead, since instead of producing the standard requirement of approximately 10 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants, according to the United Nations
estimates, the present level of performance in the less developed areas averages
only 2 to 3 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Part III). Housing
and the Human Environment, 2 HUMAN SETrLEMENTS 42 (Jan. 1972) (Centre for
Housing, Building, and Planning, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United
Nations).
7. G. A. Res. 2998 and 2999 (XXVII, Dec. 15, 1972). Resolution 2998 not only
called for establishment of a housing program within the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, but also tied that program to sociological as well
as economic goals, and recommended the establishment of such domestic financial
institutions as would be necessary to implement the plan:
The GeneralAssembly,
1. Recommends that all development assistance agencies such as the United
Nations Development Programme and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development should in their development assistance activities also give high
priority to requests from Governments for assistance in housing and human
settlements;
2. Recommends that, in its lending policies in this sector, the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development should provide funds on terms and
conditions which fully reflect the unique nature and characteristics of housing and
related investments;
3. Recommends that in establishing criteria for eligibility for loans under
more favourable terms and conditions the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development should take into account, in addition to economic and monetary

176
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reaffirmed its pledge to meet the housing crisis,8 and began planning for the International Habitat Conference of 1976.9
Nevertheless, the efforts of the United Nations in housing
development have been fragmented, sporadic ° and clearly insufficient to meet world housing needs. In recent years the
proportion of U.N. funds allocated to technical assistance for
criteria, such critical socioeconomic factors as levels of unemployment, rates of
urban growth, population density, and the general condition of the housing stock
in the developing countries;
4. Further recommends that as a matter of priority the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, in agreement with requesting Governments,
should implement its stated policy of providing seed capital loans on favourable
terms, taking into account the recommendations in paragraph 3 above, for the
establishment of domestic financial institutions and organizations to mobilize and
allocate capital for housing and related investments.
Furthermore, Resolution 2999 called for the 'establishment of a specific international
fund, basing its recommendation once again on socioeconomic grounds and the historical
record of inaction in international housing:
The General Assembly,
Concerned with the lack of improvement in the deplorable world housing
situation, particularly the critical shortage of low-cost housing or minimal standards of housing in developing countries,
Aware that the environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty, one
of the palpable manifestations of which is the substandard quality of human
settlements, particularly in developing countries,
Recognizing the need for intensified and more concrete international action
to strengthen national programmes in the planning, improvement and management
of rural and urban settlements, thereby narrowing the growing gap between
housing needs and available supply and improving the environmental quality of
human settlements,
1. Endorses in principle the establishment of an international fund or financial
institution for the purpose envisaged in recommendation 17 of the Action Plan
for the Human Environment [viz., improvement of housing conditions in developing countries].
8. G.A. Res. 3327 (XXIX, Dec. 16, 1974).
9. G.A. Res. 3001 (XXVII) and 3128 (XXVIII) established the Habitat Conference, which took place in Vancouver, Canada on May 31-June 11, 1976. See
generally 13 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE No. 7 at 50 (July 1976) which summarizes
the proceedings of the Conference.
10. United Nations involvement in national housing economies and support of
related institutions has thus far been manifested only as an aspect of overall
economic development. The U.N. has not participated in any capitalization
schemes, but rather has taken the role of technical adviser on the regional level.
World Housing Agency, supra note 3 at 71.
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human settlements has been a mere 2 percent of the total U.N.
budget, compared to about 27 percent for agriculture and 20 percent for industry.11 Furthermore, housing activities of regional
development banks, such as the Inter-American Development
made
Bank, have actually decreased,"2 and the World Bank has
13
only minimal capital contributions to the housing sector.
Notwithstanding well-meaning proposals and, in certain instances, substantial infusions of capital by the international public
sector into housing projects, housing construction continues to
lag behind population growth. 4 Although the foreign aid donor
nations agree in principle that action must be taken, they have
not devoted sufficient resources to the housing needs of their
foreign aid recipients. 5 Domestic housing programs in less dell.

U.N. Doc. OPI/CESI Note 317 at 2 (Apr. 21, 1975).
12. Inter-American Development Bank loan disbursements for housing decreased
from 7 percent of cumulative total loans for 1961-73 to 5 percent for the 1969-75

period. See IADB

ANNUAL REPORT

1973 at 25; IADB

ANNUAL REPORT

1975 at 39.

For background on regional housing development, see generally J. Suz, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS (1974); J. Wi'TE, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
(1972). One sector of public international -housing financing that has increased is
intergovernmental joint ventures. See Rendell, Commonwealth Development Corporation Experience with Joint Ventures, in PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1972); and

see generally K.
(1966).

BIVENS

& E.

LOVELL, JOINT VENTURES WITH

FOREIGN PARTNERS

13. The World Bank Annual Reports do not list figures specifically for housing,
but for "urbanization," which includes housing as well as urban paving, sewage systems,

disaster reconstruction, and so forth. Wotv

BANK

ANNUAL

REPORT

1975 at 65.

In the period 1964 to 1968, the World Bank and the International Development Association authorized no loans for urbanization, against a total average annual loan
authorization of $986.6 million. In 1969 to 1973 annual average urbanization loans
amounted to 0.48 percent of the total average *annual loan authorization ($12.2 million
for urbanization as against $2540.2 million overall). In 1973, urbanization loans
amounted to 1.06 percent of total loan authorizations ($36 million as against $3408
million) ; in 1974 the percentage of urbanization loans authorized increased to 2.61
percent ($113 million as against $4313.6 million), and in 1975 the percentage of loans
for urbanization decreased to 1.59 percent. ($93 million as against $5,895.8 million
total). Thus, although 1975 shows a downturn'in percentage of loans authorized for
urbanization, the long-term trend reflects a. slight increase in the percentage of loans

for urbanization. WoRLD

BANK ANNUAL .REPORT

1975 passim.

14. WORLD HOUSING SURVEY, U.N. Doc. E/C.6/129 (1973).
15. The following figures have been given for the percent contributions to bilateral housing aid from the given nations' total bilateral aid commitments: France,
7.7 percent; Great Britain, 6.1 percent; Norway, 3.7 percent; United States, 2.6 percent. Furthermore, "resources from all other countries devoted to aiding housing,
building and planning represent less than 2 .percent of their total bilateral assistance.'"
. ,
World Housing Agency, supra note 3 at 72...
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veloped countries (LDCs) have also been inadequate. 16 In 1969
industrialized countries invested more than 4 percent of their
gross national product in housing; France, Italy, Japan and
Switzerland each invested over 6 percent. In contrast, the less
developed countries had an average investment rate of 2 percent
or less.' 7 The LDCs' limited commitment to their own housing
needs has affected the construction industry as well as the overall
economy of these countries. Building construction and its ancillary operations normally employ 10 to 15 percent of the active
population in the more developed countries, but such activities
employ only 6 to 8 percent in the underdeveloped areas of the
world. 18 The majority of the underdeveloped nations also fail
to take advantage of labor-intensive building technologies. In
some African countries, for example, imported technology-intensive building materials account for 60 percent of construction
costs, in spite of the availability of indigenous materials that can
be adapted for use in modem construction.' 9
Other barriers related to a country's ability to stimulate
housing development include the scarce supply of developed land
and rampant land speculation. 0 Furthermore, housing programs
16.

UNITED

NATIONS

CENTER

FOR HOUSING,

BUILDING,

HELP PRACTICES IN HOUSING, SELECTED CASE STUDIES

AND

PLANNING

SELF-

(1974).

17. U.N. Doc. OPI/CESI Note 299 (Jan. 3, 1975) at 2. This report abstracts a
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 1974 REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL

part of the U.N.

SITUATION OF THE COMMISSION FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

The result of this allocation of resources is that:
Some developing countries build less than ten percent of their requirements;
in most of them less than two housing units per 1000 inhabitants are built
annually. Latin America has a deficit of 20 million units. In Asia and the Far
East the deficit was 147 million units in 1960, with investment in housing running
at about one and one half to two percent of the national income - far short of
the minimum 4.6 percent needed. On a more human level, street sleeping is a
common practice in cities like Calcutta, where literally thousands of people are
without homes. In Bombay, a city of 5.5 million, one in every 66 persons was
homeless in 1963; another 77,000 people lived under stairways, in cattle sheds, on
landings, or similarly inadequate shelter..
A World Housing Agency, supra note: 3 at 68 (footnotes deleted).
18. U.N. Doc. OPI/CESI -Note 299 (Jan. 3, 1975) at 3.
19. U.N. Doc.E/C.6/129 (1973)..
20. See generally, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, Urbanization - Sector Working Paper, Hearings
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established by developing nations have generally been misdirected.
Most assistance has been given to middle-income families and state
employees, leaving the vast majority of poor families without any
assistance. 21 Those housing programs specifically intended to
benefit low-income families have failed in many instances, because
of deficiencies in program administration to account for family
income and resources, and to oversee applications, subsidies and
collections.22 In short, the governmental machinery required to
support housing programs is frequently inadequate or simply
23

lacking.

While its own efforts to provide solutions to the housing
crisis have been inadequate, the public sector also has been
reluctant to provide incentives for private foreign investment.
For example, when the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development was created in 1961, one of its primary intended
financial activities involved guaranteeing private foreign investments. In spite of this, the Bank has made very little use of the
Before the Subcom. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 85-163 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings];Urban Land Policy, id. at 164-78.
21. Senate Hearings,supranote 20 at 111.
22. Another commentator has summarized the "principal contributing factors to
the generally poor performance of the housing sector during the First United Nations
Development decade" as including:
(a) Failure to appreciate the economic impact of housing and related construction programmes;
(b) Lack of clear policies concerning the volume, type and location of housing
to be built in a given period;
(c) Failure to understand and use dynamic social forces associated with
housing programmes;
(d) Lack of effective institutions to formulate and implement programmes
of housing and community facilities;
(e) Lack of appropriate financial systems, institutions and related legal and
fiscal measures;
(f) Shortage of training of professional and skilled personnel in all fields
required for housing programmes.
Implications of Population Trends on Urban Development and Housing, supra note 5,
at 62.
23. See Howard, Law as a Resource of Development, 18 IN'L DEv. REv. 9
(1976).
Various U.N. committees that have been organized to study the crisis in
human settlements remain committed to public rather than private financing of housing.
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guaranteeing powers authorized by its charter.2 Instead, it has
emphasized direct loans to central banks and government agencies
as have most other international development institutions. Borrowers also have preferred direct loans in order to retain control
and supervision of their national housing programs. In principle,
retention of control is a sound objective; however, the insufficient
amount of funds generated by public institutions, coupled with
the inefficient bureaucratic administration of those funds, have
only added to the housing crisis.
In summary, international, regional and domestic housing programs have, on the whole, failed to satisfy the housing
needs of developing nations. In light of the failure of public
funding, it is reasonable to turn to the private sector. If a competitive private international market can be created to attract
housing funds, the profit motive will help to ensure an effective allocation of resources; this, in turn, will tend to stabilize
further the economies in which those funds are ultimately invested. As national housing construction expands, absorbing
labor and creating backward linkages in the domestic economies,
further investment in those economies will in turn become more
appealing, while at the same time the beneficiary nations will be
able to proceed with development using the public funds that
are released. In short, the creation of a successful private international housing investment market can lead to economic growth
and self-determination.
The development of a private international housing investment system has been hampered, not by a lack of funds, but by
the absence of a market mechani sm whereby funds that are available can be invested. In principle, the mechanisms that have
been developed by market pressures and governmental intervenA recent article summarizing the recommendations and resolutions on human settlements by the General Assembly at its .28th -session noted:
In a comparison of mortgage subsidy programs with housing subsidy programs, it was stated that, in priniiple, housing programs would be more efficient
than mortgage programs. The reason: mortgage programs may simply result
in larger loans being made available, with less effect on housing objectives.
4 HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 43 (1974) Centre for Housing, Building and Planning,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. But see P. Ady (ed.),
PRIVATE FoRE6IN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1971), in which it is
argued that only private overseas investment can cure the ills of the developing
countries.
24. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1975 at 7.
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tion in the industrialized countries - namely, mortgages and, in
some countries, mortgage-backed bonds - can be employed on
an international scale. In practice, however, there are numerous
impediments to the use of real estate as security for international
loans. These impediments can only be overcome by cooperative
planning among the investors, the governments of the countries
in which the real estate is located, and the international and
national organizations who must serve as insurers of the investments. Such planning will necessarily be complex, but the legal
and financial prerequisites for the creation of an international
private housing investment system are already in existence. All
that is required is coordination of these elements in a smoothly
functioning and reliable investment environment.

DOMESTIC MORTGAGE MARKETS: IMPERFECTIONS
25
AND REMEDIES
Domestic mortgage markets suffer inherent imperfections
that decrease their competitiveness with other forms of invest26
ment.
Each property is unique and thus creates special problems of
valuation and servicing.27 The value of one property in a portfolio
bears little or no relation to the value of any other property, and
at a given time depends on the maintenance and upkeep by the

25. See Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market, 66 N.W.
UNIV. L. REV. 1 (1971).
26. The relative advantage of an investment such as real estate and its related
security instruments (such as mortgages) is based on a comparison of the investor's
potential rates of return for alternative investment opportunities. The rate of return is
a function of risk, and the factors involved in the calculation of risk for real estate
investment have been summarized in F. BABCOCK, THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE

(1932).

See also N.

KINNARD, JR., INCOME PROPERTY VALUATION

(1971).

27. The market imperfection of real estate and its effect on the investment
community has been broadly discussed by the commentators. See R. BROWN, REAL
ESTATE ECONOMICS 54-77 (1965) ; R. RATCLIFF, REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS 227-68 (2d
ed. 1961) ; Dasso, Changing Economic Conditions and the Condemnation Value of
Real Property,48 ORE. L. REv. 237 (1969).
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mortgagor and on the accuracy of loan-to-value appraisals. 28 For
these reasons, mortgages lack fungibility.
In addition, the legal structures that provide security for
investors, for example, title recordation statutes,2 9 lack uniformity
and present a trap for the unwary. Another market imperfection
of mortgages is that the elasticity of the demand for housing is
uncertain.3 0
The mortgagor's economic status is another source of unreliability. Here, it is illuminating to contrast the mortgage market with other investment markets. Corporate bonds are issued
generally by stable enterprises of perpetual existence and are
subject to stringent federal and state regulation. Residential
mortgagors, on the other hand, are private parties for the most
part beyond the scope of present federal and state security laws
and are more vulnerable to the viscissitudes of life. Timely repayment of residential mortgages thus depends on the financial
responsibility of the borrower.
Corporate securities also have the advantage of a well-defined
secondary market. In contrast, the lack of liquidity, together with

The methodology of property valuation is more an art than a science, deon the myriad of factors that involve among others, the property's location
state of the economy. For excellent reviews of these factors see Cooper,
& Guntermann, An Introduction to Appraisal and Yield Analysis, in REAL
ESTATE AND URBAN LAND ANALYSIS 585 (J. R. Cooper & K. L. Guntermann eds.
1974) (hereinafter cited as Cooper & Guntermann); W. KINNARD, INCOME PROPERTY
VALUATION (1971).
28.
pendent
and the
Farrell,

29. See generally Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66

YALE

L.J. 492 (1957).

30. F. CASE, REAL ESTATE 101-21 (1959), reprinted in Cooper & Guntermann,
supra note 28 at 357, 361. One commentator, however, suggests that demand for
housing is in fact predictable. Muth, The Demand for Non-Farm Housing in Cooper
& Guntermann, supra note 28 at 379. He derives equations relating overall demand
to rate of replacement demand, actual present stock of housing, and desired stock.
His analysis yields the familiar "feast and famine" syndrome of construction and
housing investment. On the other hand, Muth's analysis does not take psychological
factors of investing into account, in spite of the fact that empirical market realities
suggest that these psychological factors, viz., the attitudes of lending institutions,
play a significant role in the availability of capital for housing. See Bentley and
Macbeth, Mortgage Lenders and the Housing Supply, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 149 (1972).
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the cost of servicing, reduces the attractiveness and relative yield
of a mortgage.8 '
An international mortgage market would suffer from some of
the same problems which plague domestic martgage markets.
3
These risks are intensified, however, at the international level. 2

Many countries have inconsistent and arbitrary recording statutes,3 3 as well as regulations of tenure and mortgages which are
inadequate for contemporary needs.3 4 Furthermore, laws of many
jurisdictions, particularly in the developing nations, place prohibitive restrictions on alien ownership of land.3 5 As a result, an
investor in a mortgage originating in a foreign country may lack
an appropriate remedy in the event of a borrower's default.
In addition to the usual problems connected with mortgages,
an international mortgage market would have its own peculiar imperfections. An individual or corporation interested in real estate
abroad might be dissuaded from investing there because of the
difficulty of closely managing the property, even if foreclosure
to recover the security in the event of default were assured.
Political uncertainties, which may be especially acute in less developed countries, also affect the quality of the investment.
Potential uncertainties in foreign exchange markets, and actual
31. As noted in the testimony of James W. Rouse in Study of Mortgage Credit,
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th

Cong., 1st Sess. 405-16 (1959).
32. The literature does not contain a single volume devoted exclusively to the
subject of international real estate transactions. However, many of the problems
confronting international transactions would apply to the real estate field as well, for
example, expropriation and devaluation. Currency devaluation become a particularly
sensitive consideration in international real estate transactions because the long-term
nature of such transactions requires either long-term currency stability or insurance.
Standard works on international investment in general include ABA, THE PROTECTION
OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD. A REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

TRADE AND

INVESTMENT,

SECTION

OF INTERNATIONAL

AND

COMPARATIVE

LAW (1963) ; LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, (C. Shaw
ed. 1962) ; THE PROTECTION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT

(f. Starke ed. 1966).

33. E. DowsoN & V. L. 0. SHEPPARD, LAND
1956) ; E. ABENSOUR & P. MORAL-LoPEZ, PRINCIPLES

REGISTRATION

98-147 (London,

OF LAND TENANCY LEGISLATION

(1966) (global survey) (FAO, Rome).

34. Implications of Population Trends on Urban Development and Housing, 24
ECON. BULL. ASIA AND FAR EAST 53, at 62 (1973), U.N. Doc. E/CN.11/1105 (1973).

35. A. A.

FATOULOS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FoREIGN INVESTORS

See also, G. R.

DELAUME,

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

TRANSNATIONAL

Ch. III at 22 (1975).

CONTRACTS

-

APPLICABLE

41 (1962).
LAW AND
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or possible restrictions on international movement of currencies
are also discouraging factors. Other problems include the potential for possibilities of expropriation,"0 and currency differences.
and values including differential inflation rates.
All of these risks combine to make international mortgage
investment relatively unattractive. Obviously, private international investment in housing could be facilitated by the development of a mechanism that would decrease the risks of suchinvestment and would ensure liquidity. The creation of an inter36. While expropriation is currently an insurable risk - see Overseas Investment - Liability of United States Government Under Expropriation Insurance Contract, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 721 (1975) - the current position of developing countries
with respect to sovereignty over their natural resources, including land, may make
the costs of expropriation insurance prohibitive. This position is embodied in the
1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
A/RES/3281 (xxix). Although the rhetoric of the Group of 77 (the developing
countries) has been directed toward assertions of sovereignty and control over natural
resources, rather than land qua real property, a burgeoning international mortgage
market might prompt interference in the capitalist process of land ownership and
development. Thus in 1972 one commentator noted that "private investment must
be carefully managed if the investor is to avoid the counter-productive appearance of
exploitation." World Housing Agency, supra note 3 at 77. This caution applies with
even greater force today in light of the developing countries' posture toward their
resources.
In addition, there are legal difficulties surrounding the enforcement of contracts between the governments of developing countries and foreign corporations:
[P]ositive international law protection for such contracts thus appears to
be presently non-negotiable with the Group of 77. While it does not follow
from this that governments will not observe their undertakings or that such
contracts are not governed by international law, . . . it must be recognized that,
where governments do not observe their commitments to foreign investors, appeals
to international law will have to meet the argument that these propositions are
no longer accepted by a significant segment of the international community.
Haight, The New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAw 591, 601 (1975). This area of international law
is extremely uncertain; the legal effect of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States is not yet clear, not the least because of the uncertainty as to the extent to which the Group of 77 will match its actions to its rhetoric (id. at 604). In sum,
expropriation remains, at least for the present, an insurable risk, but one that bears
careful watching.
37. One factor affecting exchange rate fluctuation is inflation. An example of a
mechanism to correct mortgage values for inflation by adjusting the face value of the
mortgage obligation as inflation increases is discussed in Lefcoe, Monetary Correction
and Mortgage Lending in Brazil, 21 STAN. L. REv. 106, 126-40 (1968). Such schemes
require sophisticated banking apparatus and government cooperation. In the case of
United States banks holding foreign mortgages, the United States banks could supply
the sophistication often lacking in banks of foreign nations.
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national secondary mortgage market based on mortgage-backed
securities, such as those currently in use in Germany", and the
United States, 89 could solve all of these problems.
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: 4 0 A METHOD OF ATTRACTING
PRIVATE CAPITAL TO FINANCE HOUSING PROGRAMS

The Government National Mortgage
Association Experience
In the United States, Title VIII of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 created the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA). 1 One function of GNMA is to
38. Mortgage-backed securities have existed in Germany since 1770, when they
were authorized by Frederick the Second following an economic crisis precipitated
by the Seven Years' War. See JONES AND GREBLER, THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET 47-102 (1961), noted in Bartke, supra note 25, at 44-45; Fredericksen, Mortgage Banking in Gernmany, 9 Q. J. Ecox. 47 (1895). German law currently provides
for the issuance of negotiable bonds secured by a pool of real estate mortgages, Law
of 1963, Bundesgestzblatt [BGB 1] 1 368, § 5(l) (W. Ger.). The mortgage-backed
securities are referred to as "Hypothekenpfandbriefe." Sections 29-31 provide that
the availability and adequacy of the pooled mortgages is to be supervised by a trustee.
Section 6(1) provides that the yield of the mortgages securing the bond must equal
the bond interest at all times.
39. Notwithstanding the difficulty of quantitative analysis in the housing demand
and mortgage supply areas, there is strong evidence that federally underwritten mortgages in the United States have a tendency to mitigate fluctuation in housing construction. Guttentag, The Short Cycle in Residential Construction, 1946-1959, in
Cooper & Guntermann, supra note 28, 409-29. The effect of similar programs on the
international level presumably would be similar, but the point has not been discussed
in the literature.
40. The concept of a secondary mortgage market has been defined as "the ability
of mortgage investors, in an organized fashion either to dispose of mortgages in their
portfolios through sale or to convert such mortgages into securities acceptable to
other segments of the investment public, directly or indirectly." Bartke, supra note 25
at 8. Bartke further notes that the term "secondary mortgage market" is susceptible
to a spectrum of definitions, engendering an even broader spectrum of confusions.
His definition of the secondary mortgage market as an "ability" perhaps adds further
to the confusion, but substituting "means whereby" for "ability" gives a functional
definition that is certainly suitable for our purposes.
41. 12 U.S.C. §§ 17-23 (1971). For an extensive review of the Government
National Mortgage Association, see Ganis, All About the GNMA Mortgage-Backcd
Securities Market, 4 REAL EST. REV. 55 (Summer 1964). Before the creation of
GNMA, the so-called conversion principle was used several times in an attempt to
develop a negotiable security for real estate financing. The first attempt to convert
mortgages into bonds that would be attractive to the investing public was made in the
1880s and 1890s. Bartke, supra note 25 at 8-11. The mortgage companies that issued
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guarantee mortgage-backed securities issued against pools of
FHA and VA mortgages, and, as a result of recent legislation,
privately insured conventional mortgages. The guarantee is
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. GNMA
mortgage-backed securities are thus equal in investment quality
to federal government notes and bonds.
Two types of GNMA mortgage-backed securities are authorized by legislation: fixed-maturity mortgage-backed bonds
and pass-through securities. Pass throughs, the only type
of security insured by GNMA to date, are fully amortizable
securities in which all of the principal and interest is passed
through to the holder of the bond, regardless of whether payments
are actually made by the mortgagors or the insurer of the mortgage upon default. The typical guarantee plan provides for the
pooling of new thirty-year FHA and VA home loans and the
issuance of a security against this pool. The security carries a
coupon rate of one-half of one percent less than the rate of the
pooled mortgages. This half percent includes GNMA's guarantee
fee of 6/100ths percent and the issuer's service fee of 44/100th
percent per annum.
The major issuers of GNMA pass-through securities are
mortgage and commercial banks. The objectives of these institutions are to establish a mortgage servicing portfolio and to
attract private funds from alternative investment opportunities
into investments in the local mortgage market. The securities
share property approval and borrower credit approval with the
FHA and the VA.
At times during the past five years, GNMA mortgage-backed
securities have been issued at yields equal to or greater than the
interest rate of the mortgages securing the GNMA-insured dethe debentures were unsupervised by government and did not trade the mortgages in
2
an organized fashion. A second attempt was made in the 19 0s. These mortgagebacked bonds were not issued against pools of mortgages, but against specific mortgages to finance particular undertakings, thus representing fractional interests in such
mortgages. See Posner, The Lesson of Guaranteed Mortgage Certificates, 26 HARV.
Bus. REv. 560 (1948) ; Note, Present Problems in New York Mortgages, 36 CoLUM.
L. REv. 663 (1934); E. FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS: CHARACTERISTICS
AND FINANCING 28-35 (1951). Mortgage "warehousing," in which short-term bank
credit is used to finance long-term mortgages, also exists as a substitute for a welldeveloped secondary mortgage market. See Guttentag, Mortgage Warehousing, 12
J. FIN. 438 (1957) ; Kaplan, Recent Institutional Arrangements in Mortgage Lending,
13 J. FIN. 188 (1958).
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benture. This is possible for two reasons. First, issuers are
interested in servicing fees; they are willing to forego profit on
the origination of the bond in order to remain competitive with
alternative investments, achieving their profit through the servicing fees. Second, FHA and VA loans usually involve discounts
("points") paid by the buyer and seller of the property. These
points provide a yield that is greater than the yield from the
interest rate of the mortgages pooled as security. The issuer thus
has the option of offering bonds at a discount or at a higher rate
of interest. Discounted bonds that entail a loss on origination
are ultimately profitable because of servicing fees and the advantageous spread on the reinvestment of such new funds.
Many issues of GNMA pass throughs are negotiated for delivery and payment at some future date. Advance commitments
enable issuers to write mortgages that they know are funded and
pre-sold. In many instances, this advance-commitment procedure
is the incentive that prompts the issuers to enter the mortgage
market.
To date, defaults by issuers of GNMA pass-through securities
have been minimal.4 '

A PRoPOsED MODEL FOR ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET
Loan Origination, Mortgage Servicing and The
Creation of a Mortgage-Backed Security
The Role of a Home Bank
The initial requirement for an international mortgage-backed
securities market is the establishment of an institution to originate
the loan, that is, the creation of a mortgage bank in the situs
42. According to GNMA:
Since inception of the program GNMA has had to pay claims on 8 percent of
the projects placed in security pools, and an additional 10 percent of the project
mortgages in security pools are delinquent. Claims paid on project pools through
June 30, 1975 totalled $832,000 against guarantee fees collected of $1.8 million ....
To decrease GNMA's exposure on such pools, GNMA modified its regulations,
effective March 1, 1975 so that the issuer of the security assumes responsibility
for all costs not covered by the FHA claim settlement up to a maximum of 1
percent of the mortgage amount in the event of mortgage assignment during the
first three years of a security.
GNMA ANNUAL REPORT at 12 (1975).
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country of the real estate.43 This "home bank" could take several
forms. Savings and loan institutions, or the central banks of
countries that do not presently have a savings and loan system,
could be utilized. In nations lacking either a well-developed
mortgage mechanism or a banking system willing to undertake
such a program, national governments or housing agencies could
temporarily fill the role of a home bank. Such entities could
employ foreign banks to supply the expertise necessary to undertake and administer the lending program."
The home bank would be responsible for creating a pool of
mortgages through loans to resident nationals. This pool would be
used to secure a mortgage-backed security (bond) issued by the
home bank for sale on the international market. Thus, the proposed model for establishing an international mortgage-backed
securities market would parallel the plan in the United States
establishing a domestic mortgage-backed securities market.
The Role of a Trustee
The creation of an international mortgage-backed securities
market would also require the appointment of an independent
trustee, to whom legal title to the mortgages would be transferred.
Preferably, the trustee would be a resident of the situs country.
The home bank would retain equitable title to the mortgages and
would be responsible for all payments, terms and covenants of
the bonds. In the event of default by the home bank, equitable
43. At the present time, it is not realistic to consider origination of loans by
banks foreign to the situs country. The present proposal, however, does not rule
out the possibility of such mortgages in the future, under the appropriate safeguards.
44. In such cases, the foreign bank's role would be limited to giving advice or
planning and operating the lending program. The scope of the foreign bank's duties
would vary, of course, according to the authorization of the situs government. See
note 43 supra.
45. Trustees are commonly used in international bond arrangements. It is important that the trustee be a resident of the country where the property is situated
and meet the local qualifications of a trustee in order that he will be able to legally
enforce and accept the responsibilities which this article contemplates. In the United
States, under the Trust Indenture Act, at least one of the trustees must at all times
be a corporation organized and doing business in the United States and must meet
certain capital requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (1971). France has similar specific
trustee qualification requirements, French Civil Code D.L.P.B. art. 25. In Peru, the
trustee must be the central mortgage bank, Peruvian Civil Code art. 1807. See
generally G. R. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT

FINANCING

55--56 (1967)

[hereinafter cited as

DELAUME].
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title would merge with legal title. The trustee would then assume
the responsibility of servicing the mortgages in every respect,
making distributions in accordance with the provisions of the
bonds, guarantees, insurance, and other related agreements.46 The
interposition of a trustee would thus ensure the existence of a
resident institution to carry on the servicing functions, thereby
ameliorating foreclosure and other administrative burdens facing
a nonresident guarantor and payment problems facing a nonresident investor.4 7 Additionally, the trustee would safeguard the
home bank's fulfillment of the conditions of the indenture and any
other related agreements. The trustee would be responsible to
all parties of the transaction: home bank, mortgage insurance
company and its guarantor, guarantor of the security instrument
backed by such mortgages, and the holder of the mortgage-backed
security. If local law permitted, the trustee could be a corporate
entity with its stock held by the international guarantor as further
assurance of control of such trustees.
46. Under the laws of many countries, if the agreement provides that it is to be
enforced only by the trustee, then the trustee, and not the bondholders, is the only
party authorized to seek adherence to the indenture agreement. In other words, no
individual cause of action exists in the bondholders. Kerr v. Societe Pyrenees Minerals,
Cass. Feb. 19, 1908, Clunet 1912, 243, affirming Court of Appeals of Toulouse July
18, 1905, Clunet 1906, 451; Palau v. Departamento do Antioqua, 48 Gaceta Judicial
808-17 (French summary in Clunet 1940-45, 589). Ambiguities in the agreement may
cause substantial problems in the practical mechanics of the arrangement; in at least
one case the language of the agreement was construed as causing the obligor to
lose all control over the funds remitted to the trustee, Ehag Eisenbahnwerke Holding,
A. G. v. Banca Nationala A Romanei, 306 N.Y. 242, 117 N.E.2d 346 (1954). See also
DELAUME, supra note 45, at 63-66.
47. Thus, Delaume states that:
[T]he doctrine of immunity may prevent lenders from enforcing their rights
against foreign governments in any court other than those in the borrower's
country. Lenders generally do not regard a right to sue in these courts as a satisfactory remedy; and they cannot safely rely on the borrower's willingness to
waive its immunity in the courts of the lender's country at the time of an actual
dispute. Lenders therefore often turn to other devices. One device is to stipulate
in the loan agreement that the borrower submits to the jurisdiction of a designated forum and waives any right to sovereign immunity with respect to its
obligations under the agreement. Provisions such as these are enforced in the
courts of Continental countries. They may prove extremely valuable also in
countries like the United States, in which it is not clear whether waivers of
immunity are irrevocable. In view of the relatively close world of the lending
community, the borrower might experience embarrassment if it attempted to
escape a commitment to submit to jurisdiction.
DELAUME, supra note 45, at 159-60.

190

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

Insurance: The Role of an International Agency
The key to creating a workable international mortgagebacked securities market is the establishment of payment guarantees at various levels: insurance of payments by the mortgagor
to the home bank (insurance on the mortgage), and insurance
of payments by the home bank to the owner of the bond (insurance on the mortgage-backed security). These guarantees would
induce the home bank to make the loan to the mortgagor, and
would induce the investor to purchase the mortgage-backed
security from the home bank. The interposition of an international agency to provide such insurance would be highly
desirable.
The Need for Mortgage Insurance
In order to guarantee repayment of the loan, the mortgage
instrument should provide for insurance of the individual mortgages. Insurance adequate to cover all risks could be provided
by a two-tier system. First, either a private insurance company
of the situs country or the government of the situs country would
assume primary liability for default on the loan. If the initial
risk were underwritten by a private insurance company of the
situs country, the government should subsidize the cost of the
insurance. Without such subsidy, the insurance expense would
be passed on to the mortgagor and would probably affect his
ability to meet his payments. If the initial risk were underwritten
by the situs government, the government would subsidize part
of the cost of the insurance, and would pass the remainder of the
cost on to the mortgagor. Again, that part of the insurance expense paid by the mortgagor should not be so great as to exceed
his ability to make his mortgage payments.
Second, an international agency, such as the World Bank,
would assume secondary liability for default on the loan. This
institution's liability would be invoked in such situations as
expropriation, when the government of the situs country seized
ownership and control of the mortgaged properties (but not the
home bank) and refused to honor its primary insurance obligations. The cost of such secondary insurance could be pushed up
the line toward the mortgagor as far as his ability would allow.
Where the expense became overly burdensome to the mortgagor,
the government of the situs country could again subsidize the
remaining cost. The funds to pay for primary and secondary
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insurance subsidies would be taken from the capital freed by the
government's dissociation from public housing programs. Such
dissociation would be possible because of the replacement of public
by private capital generated through the international mortgagebacked securities market.
Primary and secondary insurance would encourage home
banks to make residential loans by protecting them from loss.
Although housing loans in developing countries are high-risk
ventures, subsidization of the cost of that risk would lower the
actual risk incurred by the lending institution, thus making
profitable the issuance of such loans in increasing numbers.
The Need for Mortgage-Backed Security Insurance
In order to guarantee payment of the principal and interest
due on the mortgage-backed security, the indenture agreement
should provide for insurance of the bond. Here, a two-tier system
would not necessarily be appropriate, and an international organization such as the World Bank would probably have to provide the complete guarantee. First, the investor would lack control over, and consequently confidence in the situs government
as guarantor. The sovereignty of the situs country would protect
it from any legal action arising from its failure to honor the
security guarantee. The only influence which the security holder
could exert toward payment of the obligation in the event of
default would be through his own government. Even if the investor believed that his government could induce payment by
the situs government, or guarantor on the mortgage-backed
security, he would probably prefer to make a safer investment.
Also, the investor would probably lack confidence in a private
insurer in the situs country, primarily for the same reasons. In
either case, if the investor decided to purchase the security, he
would probably insist on a prohibitive yield if the risk were not
covered by a reliable international institution. This would place
a heavy restraint on the mortgagor, who would have to pay higher
interest rates, on the home bank, which would have to forego
some of its profit, and on the situs government, which would
have to provide greater subsidies.
The international agency guaranteeing the mortgage-backed
security could, like GNMA, charge the home bank a very small
percentage of the mortgage principal to pay for the expense of
guaranteeing the security. The expense could be passed on, in
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whole or in part, to the mortgagor. Any difference could again
be made up by the situs government in the form of a subsidy. The
rate charged by the international agency for insuring the security
could be maintained at a relatively low level by a combination
of several practices, including careful investigation into the stability of the home bank and the situs government and insurance
of a proliferating number of international mortgage-backed securities. Until the proliferation occurred, the international agency
could use its own capital for reserves, or could rely on low-interest
loans from member nations.
The participation of a strong international agency would also
discourage expropriation or noncompensation in the event of loss.
Further, the international agency would act as rulemaker, establishing the criteria for selecting the home banks that would be
allowed to offer securities. It would develop the standards by
which a particular mortgage would be deemed acceptable as
security for the mortgage-backed instrument. Thus, by making
its own regulations and strictly enforcing them, an international
agency insuring mortgage-backed securities could reduce the
overall risk of loss without requiring substantial additional expenditures.
Summary of Parties' Liabilities
The liabilities of the parties under this model for a mortgagebacked securities market may be summarized as follows:
1. The mortgage guarantee insurer (the insurance company operating in the country where the real estate is located
or the national government) would be primarily liable to
the home bank, or trustee, in the event of a loss upon foreclosure.
2. The international mortgage insurer (international
agency) would be liable to the home bank, or trustee, upon
default by the primary mortgage guarantee insurer.
3. The home bank would be primarily liable to the ultimate investor on the mortgage-backed security.
4. The international agency insuring the mortgagebacked security would be liable to the ultimate investor or
trustee upon default by the home bank.
The international agency would only be liable, then, on the mortgage-backed security if the home bank defaulted and the trustee
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had insufficient funds to pay off the bonds. Its liability would
be limited, therefore, to situations where (1) the value of the real
property securing the original mortgage proved insufficient to
satisfy the mortgage debt, and (2) the mortgage insurance company insuring the mortgage and the home bank were both in:solvent.
SOME WORKING PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED

MODEL AND POSSmLE SOLUTIONS

Unexpected Maturity of the Mortgaged-Backed
Security Caused by Prepayment or
Default of Mortgages
The unexpected maturity of a mortgage-backed security could
hinder the viability of the proposed model. If the home bank
,could pay off the securities when the mortgages supporting them
were prepaid or in default, the investor would have virtually
no idea how long his money would be invested. This uncertainty
would add an additional risk factor from the investor's standpoint.
The investor would question his ability to reinvest funds prematurely received at the same yield he had bargained for when
the bonds were purchased, since prepayments are typically made
when interest rates drop significantly. A mortgage-backed security in the international market lacking a fixed term would
be less desirable than alternative fixed-term investments and
would demand a prohibitively high interest rate to attract investors. 48 Thus, in order to attract investors, a mortgage-backed
:security should have a fixed term.
In light of this problem, how should prepayment and default
of mortgages be handled? Certainly, the home bank would prefer
to avoid prepayment or foreclosure so that it would not have to
rely on the availability of substituted investments at the same
or greater yield than the prepaid or foreclosed mortgages. However, if the homeowner's demands for the right of prepayment
prevailed, the ensuing risk could be mitigated in two ways. First,
the term of the security could be set by the home bank at the
48. In order to avoid an excessive risk on the home bank as a result of a fixed
term, it would be advisable to allow the bond to be called at the option of the home
bank upon payment of a premium to the investor. The home bank should have the
right to exercise this option only on certain prearranged dates. The premium would
compensate the investor for such prepayment, and the call option would preserve
flexibility for the home bank.
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average life of its mortgages, based on prior experience. This.
would stabilize the effect of prepayments and foreclosure in the
mortgage pool. Second, the international agency could require the
home bank to maintain a separate mortgage portfolio from which
mortgages could be substituted to replace any prepaid or foreclosed mortgage. In such case, the home bank could transfer
prepayment or foreclosure sale proceeds directly to the trustee,
in whom legal title had been vested; the trustee would then use
the money to purchase another mortgage from the home bank's
portfolio. In the case of default, the home bank would have
the additional choice of taking title to the property and holding
it for sale at a later date. Of course, the home bank would need
to replace the defaulted mortgage with a similar mortgage to
maintain the mortgage pool. The substituted mortgage could
also be taken from the separate mortgage portfolio. Using these
measures, the pool of mortgages securing the bonds would thus
remain intact, providing the necessary security and funds with
which the home bank would remain current on the bond prepayments. By this mechanism, the risk of loss to the security owner
due to prepayment or foreclosure would be substantially reduced.
Currency Devaluation
The possibility of currency devaluation presents the greatest
barrier to the development of an international mortgage-backed
securities market. Unlike inflation, currency devaluation affects
the yield generated by the investment as well as the cost of
obtaining the funds. The problem is enhanced because of the longterm nature of the bonds: the longer the life of the investment,
the greater the risk of loss resulting from currency devaluation.
Usually, private agreements among parties to an international
transaction apportion the risk of currency devaluation loss.9
It is unlikely that either the investor or the home bank would
be willing completely to accept the risk of loss due to devaluation.
The problem could be resolved by increasing the interest rates
for the mortgage or for the mortgage-backed security to compensate the investor for this exposure. Such rates, however, would
probably be prohibitive to the resident mortgagor or the home
bank, and the entire mechanism could be frustrated.
49. See DELAIJME, supra note 45, at 267-75. These agreements have taken the
form of currency options, payment in units comprised of several individual currencies,
and clauses requiring payment in specific currencies.
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The desire to obtain private investment to finance housing
projects might compel the national government to insure the
home bank against currency devaluation. The home bank could
then contract to accept the risk of loss due to currency devaluation in the indenture agreement without the fear of suffering
monetary loss, and repayment could be made in the same currency used to purchase the debt.
CONCLUSION

The success of an international secondary mortgage market
depends on the creation of a new international agency or the
cooperation of an existing one. The World Bank group is ideally
suited to fulfill this role, despite its historic lack of involvement
in residential mortgages. It has the necessary prestige, because
of its power over world trade, to discourage the expropriation of
property. Its financial soundness would make its guarantee an
effective vehicle for the development of an international market
for mortgage-backed securities, basically eliminating the risk of
loss to the investors. It can facilitate the use of private funds
to achieve international goals. As stated in the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the purposes of the Bank is to "raise the standard
of living and conditions of labor" in member countries. The standard of living in developing countries cannot be successfully raised
if housing problems are not given adequate attention. It should
be emphasized that the international agency's acceptance of all
the risks referred to in this proposal, including currency devaluation, would be significantly less than the risk associated with
direct housing investment. The establishment of an international mortgage-backed securities market could generate the
private capital necessary to create new housing and improve old
in developing countries.

